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Abstract
Owners of private companies often invest a substantial share of their net worth in one
company, which exposes them to idiosyncratic risk. For US companies we investigate
whether owners require compensation for lack of diversiﬁcation in the form of higher
returns to equity. Exposure to idiosyncratic risk is measured as the share of the owner’s
net worth invested in the company. Equity returns are measured as the earnings rate
and as capital gains. For both returns measures we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of exposure to idiosyncratic risk. This paper improves our understanding of
returns to private equity.
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and Incentive Eﬀects1 Introduction
Owners of private companies typically have a high share of their personal net worth invested
in a single private company. The large investments give them high ownership shares, which
reduces agency costs, but also exposes them to the idiosyncratic risk of the company. Ratio-
nal owners will require a compensation for this risk exposure in the form of higher returns
to their investment.
In this article, we investigate whether the owners of private companies require a com-
pensation for their risk exposure. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) ﬁnd that, on
average, returns to private equity are not higher than returns to public equity. This is puz-
zling, since private equity has an unfavourable risk-return trade-oﬀ: there does not seem
to be a compensation for idiosyncratic risk. The paper is based on the theoretical work by
Heaton and Lucas (2002), who use a consumption-based model to argue that poorly diver-
siﬁed entrepreneurs should require a large return premium over public equity. A simulation
by Kerins et al. (2004) also suggests that exposure to idiosyncratic risk is very costly. These
theoretical papers are based on the assumptions that entrepreneurs understand idiosyncratic
risk and that their risk aversion is suﬃciently high that it makes them require a high return
premium to accept idiosyncratic risk. Our paper is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to directly
test whether private equity owners who take on more idiosyncratic risk (relative to their
net worth) are compensated by higher average returns, and if yes, by how much. We test
whether equity returns vary systematically with risk exposure but we do not address the
question of why returns are, on average, low.
Information on private companies from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) is used. We measure exposure to idiosyncratic
1risk as the share of net worth that the owner has invested in the company. We use an
instrumental variables approach for all regressions because owners may be willing to invest
a larger amount in companies that are more proﬁtable.
We ﬁnd evidence that returns to equity is higher if owners have a higher exposure to
idiosyncratic risk. This holds for both the earnings rate (proﬁts divided by equity value)
and capital gains. The results are statistically and economically signiﬁcant and robust to
the use of diﬀerent speciﬁcations in both data sets. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that owners with
and without an active management role are concerned about idiosyncratic risk. For owners
with an active management interest we are able to control for their ownership share. Owners
with a higher ownership share have a higher incentive to work hard, since they can keep a
higher share of the resulting proﬁts for themselves. For owners with an active management
interest the SCF data allow us to explicitly control for eﬀort, measured as the average weekly
hours worked. With controls for incentives and eﬀort included, it is likely that investment
considerations give rise to the results. The results of the SCF indicate that private equity
owners who have invested an additional 10 percent of their net worth in private equity require
an average return increase of about 15.7 percentage points to take on the resulting additional
risk. We therefore ﬁnd an economically important inﬂuence of idiosyncratic risk.
The analysis improves our understanding of the behaviour of owners of private companies.
Owners demand higher expected returns from business opportunities, if they have a higher
share of net worth invested in the company. Owners can inﬂuence expected returns by
deciding in which companies to invest, which activities the company engages in, and when
to close the company or sell their stake.
How does this analysis relate to the unfavourable risk-return trade-oﬀ of private equity
found by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)? We ﬁnd that owners of private compa-
2nies demand compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. We therefore exclude one
possible explanation for low returns, namely that owners do not understand or do not care
about idiosyncratic risk. However, we cannot explain why individuals invest in private equity
given the low average level of returns. Hamilton (2000) ﬁnds that both initial earnings and
earnings growth are lower for entrepreneurs than for individuals in paid employment. The
author gives nonpecuniary beneﬁts, such as utility from being one’s own boss, or overopti-
mism as likely explanations. Our results therefore provide novel support for the argument
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) that it is puzzling that the average entrepreneur
willingly enters entrepreneurship given that the observed average private equity returns are
similar to the observed average public equity returns.
The literature already does provide some evidence that private equity investors do worry
about idiosyncratic risk. Bitler et al. (2005) show that owner-managers in riskier ﬁrms take
on a lower ownership share, as do the owner-managers with lower wealth. Furthermore, ﬁrm
size seems to be scaled down in riskier ﬁrms. The risk measure used by Bitler et al. (2005) is
the absolute value of the residual from a regression of the earnings rate on a set of controls.
The present paper improves on and supplements this work by analysing measures of the
returns earned as the outcome variable and by using the variation in idiosyncratic risk held,
generated from cross-owner diﬀerences in the share of net worth invested in the ﬁrm.
There is also evidence from venture capital and buyout funds that idiosyncratic risk mat-
ters for required returns. Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) develop a theoretical model to
analyze the role of idiosyncratic risk for the pricing of investments. The model predicts a
positive relationship between the net of fees investment returns of funds and the ex post id-
iosyncratic risk of the funds’ returns. The venture capitalist is compensated for the expected
idiosyncratic risk by the contract with the fund investors. If the venture capitalist ﬁnances
3a company with higher than expected idiosyncratic risk, a higher discount rate is applied.
The entrepreneur therefore needs to compensate the venture capitalist for higher than ex-
pected risk, even though the entrepreneur holds the market power in the model. The model
explains why venture capital discount rates can be very high. The authors test the model
with data on venture capital and buyout funds. They ﬁnd a strong correlation between
realized risk and fund returns. Realized risk is the standard deviation of the residual in a
regression of fund returns on the contemporaneous value and on lags of the excess market
return. The authors have cash ﬂow information for each fund but do not know in how many
portfolio companies the fund has invested in or whether funds have an industry focus. Data
on a fund’s diversiﬁcation are therefore limited. Our analysis diﬀers from that of Jones and
Rhodes-Kropf (2004) in that we use a more direct measure of exposure to idiosyncratic risk,
namely share of net worth invested, and, in addition, investigate a diﬀerent asset class.1
There are also studies investigating the consequences of idiosyncratic risk on sector size,
productivity growth and investment. Castro et al. (2009) use a simulation model to inves-
tigate the inﬂuence of idiosyncratic risk on the relative size of the capital and consumption
goods producing sectors. Better legal institutions allow for better risk sharing and therefore
encourage investment in the capital goods producing sector that has higher idiosyncratic
risk than the consumption goods producing sector. Michelacci and Schivardi (2008) estab-
lish for OECD countries that higher sector-level idiosyncratic risk depresses sectoral labour
productivity growth in countries with lower levels of diversiﬁcation opportunities. Panousi
and Papanikolaou (2009) ﬁnd a negative inﬂuence of idiosyncratic stock-return volatility on
the investment of publicly traded ﬁrms in the US. The authors provide evidence that this
1There are other studies investigating the returns of venture capital funds, see, for example, Cochrane
(2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003).
4eﬀect can be explained with managerial risk aversion.
The paper also adds to the literature on the inﬂuence the concentrated ownership structure
of private companies has for their performance. Ang et al. (2000) ﬁnd that a higher own-
ership share by the manager reduces agency costs. Bitler et al. (2005) document a positive
inﬂuence of ownership share on eﬀort and a positive inﬂuence of eﬀort on ﬁrm performance.
Himmelberg et al. (2002) argue that a higher share of insider ownership should increase the
cost of capital, since insiders are exposed to idiosyncratic risk. They ﬁnd conﬁrming evidence
for public companies. In their study, the variable insider ownership captures both the eﬀect
due to lack of diversiﬁcation and the eﬀect due to better incentives.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 develops the hypothesis; Section 3
describes the measure of exposure to idiosyncratic risk; Section 4 introduces the data sets
and gives summary statistics; Section 5 investigates the return measures in detail, Section 6
presents the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Development of Hypothesis
In a US study, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) have documented the prevalence
of owners’ lack of diversiﬁcation. Households with an investment in private equity have,
on average, 41% of their net worth invested in private equity, of which 82% is invested in
just one company in which the household has an active management interest. Owners are
therefore exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of the company.
The cost due to lack of diversiﬁcation has been described in the literature for diﬀerent
situations. Tobin (1958) ﬁnds in his early contribution that risk-averse investors divide their
investment in monetary assets between interest-earning but risky assets and non-interest
5earning but safe cash, in such a way as to achieve their preferred risk-return trade-oﬀ. Bren-
nan and Torous (1999) investigate investments in the stock market and ﬁnd that signiﬁcant
welfare gains can be attained by increasing the number of securities in the portfolio. Man-
agers of public companies are often deliberately exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their
companies through stock or stock options in order to provide them with incentives to exert
eﬀort. Managers value stock or stock options in their compensation contracts less, when
a greater part of their wealth is correlated with the value of the company (Lambert et al.,
1991; Meulbroek, 2001; Hall and Murphy, 2002; and Kahl et al., 2003).2
Kerins et al. (2004) use the capital asset pricing model and data on newly public companies
to derive the opportunity cost of capital for an entrepreneur with concentrated ownership.
Their simulations show that exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity capital
substantially. The authors calculate the returns achievable in the stock market with a
portfolio that has the same total risk as an investment divided between a private company
and the stock market. The stock market returns determine the opportunity cost of capital for
the entrepreneur. The authors calculate for companies with 0-25 employees that an increase
of the entrepreneur’s share of personal wealth invested in the company from 15% to 25%
increases the cost of equity capital by 14.2 percentage points.
Since the literature shows that exposure to idiosyncratic risk is costly, we expect that
owners of private companies will demand compensation for their risk exposure, if they behave
rationally. Owners can inﬂuence equity returns by deciding which projects the company
should realize. If they have a high share of their net worth invested in the company, they
2 Heaney and Holmen (2008) use data on the exposure to idiosyncratic risk for Swedish shareholders of
listed companies to approximate the value they attach to control using the model developed by Lambert
et al. (1991).
6will only agree to projects if the expected returns of the projects are suﬃcient to compensate
them for their lack of diversiﬁcation. Accordingly, we test the following hypothesis in this
paper: Owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk demand higher returns on their
equity investment as compensation.
3 Measuring Exposure to Idiosyncratic Risk
To measure the lack of diversiﬁcation we use information on the owner’s equity investment in
the company and on the owner’s net worth. The share of net worth invested in the company
is then used as proxy for exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Net worth is deﬁned as the sum of
all assets minus the sum of all liabilities of the owner.
Two measures for the share of net worth invested (SNWI) are calculated. The ﬁrst method
considers only the value of the equity investment. Depending on the data source, the value
is measured either as market value or as book value. This variable is denoted as SNWI A.
SNWI A =
(ownership share ∗ market [book] value of equity)
net worth
(1)
The second calculation takes into account that the equity investment is not the only way in
which the owner’s assets are tied to the company. Owners can also give personal guarantees
for company loans, use private assets as collateral and extend loans to the company or receive
loans from the company. The second measure for exposure to idiosyncratic risk, SNWI B,
considers these possibilities. It is calculated according to the following formula:
7SNWI B = (2)
(ownership share ∗ market [book] value of equity) + guarantees + collateral + net loans
net worth
We now turn to the discussion of whether SNWI is a good measure for risk exposure.
Owners are confronted with variability in the earnings of the company and with variability
in the value of their equity investment. These risks normally increase with SNWI. However,
return risk can also inﬂuence how much owners invest. Owners may only be willing to invest
substantial amounts if they consider the risk manageable. We therefore include a control
for return risk in all regressions.3 We divide companies into bins according to the value of
SNWI. For each bin, we calculate the interdecile range of the earnings rate and divide it
by the median of the earnings rate. For owners active in management of the SCF and the
SSBF, we use 100 bins. For owners not active in management of the SCF we use 20 bins,
since we have fewer observations and would otherwise be confronted with extreme values.
To describe owners’ risk exposure completely, it would be desirable to have information
on the correlation structure of the returns of the assets in the owners’ portfolios. The total
risk of the portfolios of owners who have an investment in the stock market is lower if the
returns to private equity are negatively correlated with the stock market compared to a
situation with a positive correlation. However, the surveys do not contain information from
which the correlation structure could be derived.
The data used for the analysis also include companies whose owners have unlimited lia-
bility, i.e. they are liable for company obligations with all their private assets. The question
3We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this risk measure.
8arises as to whether our measure of exposure to idiosyncratic risk is meaningful in this situ-
ation. The bankruptcy law in the USA stipulates that private assets below exemption limits
can be kept by owners in the case of a bankruptcy proceeding. In practice, owners often
have no assets exceeding these limits and therefore only lose their equity investment in a
bankruptcy (Berkowitz and White, 2004, p. 71, and Fan and White, 2003, p. 544). It follows
that SNWI is a valid proxy for risk exposure for owners with unlimited liability as well.4
4 Data
4.1 DATA SOURCES
The ﬁrst data source used is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is conducted
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC. The survey
provides detailed information about the ﬁnancial situation of households. We select two
subsamples from the ﬁve SCF waves between 1989 and 2001. The ﬁrst subsample includes
all households with an active management interest in a private company. The survey asks
for information about the largest three companies. We designate the household member who
4If a private company goes bankrupt in the USA with obligations still outstanding, an owner with un-
limited liability can declare personal bankruptcy to dispose of the company debt. It is possible to give up
all assets that are not exempt but to keep future earnings (Chapter 7), or to keep all assets and agree to a
repayment plan to repay part of the debts (Chapter 13). The exemption rules diﬀer between states. The
median value for home equity is USD 15,000 and the median value for other personal assets is USD 7,000
(Berkowitz and White, 2004). Furthermore, if owners agree to keep up payments on loans that are secured
on their home or private car, they do not lose these assets. If retirement savings are not excluded from the
bankruptcy proceeding in the ﬁrst place, they can be kept if the amount is reasonably necessary to support
oneself upon retirement (Jackson, 2001).
9makes the largest contribution to the running of the company as the main owner. Overall,
the subsample contains complete information on 4029 households.5 The survey asks for an
estimate of the market value of the equity share in the company. Observations for companies
with an equity value below USD 1,000 are deleted, because very small values of equity can
lead to implausibly high earnings rate ﬁgures. As a further measure to ensure plausible
earnings rate ﬁgures, the smallest and largest 1% of the observations of this variable are
excluded. For the variable capital gains, the largest 1% of observations is deleted.6 In
addition, households are required to have positive net worth and positive private wealth, i.e.
positive net worth not considering equity investments in private companies. In the end, 3900
households are included in the analysis. Of the included households, 70% have a management
interest in only one company, 20% in two and 10% in three. Overall, 5436 companies are
5The SCF includes information on assets, such as private businesses or the value of the primary residence,
only at the household level. Some information, for example education and job characteristics, is given for
individual household members. To control for individual characteristics, we determine which household
member is the main owner according to job characteristics. The survey states separately for each private
business which household members work for it. If only one person works for the business, this person is the
main owner. If both work for the business, then the single person who is self-employed in the main job is
the main owner. If both are self-employed in their main jobs, then the main owner is the one who works
the higher number of weekly hours in the main job. The same criteria apply for the second job, if both
work for the business, but neither is self-employed in the main job. We use individual owner characteristics
as instruments and as controls in the regression analysis. In the following, we use the term “owner” of the
private company and not “household” owning the private company, although diﬀerent owners may share the
same household characteristics. The clustering of the error terms in regressions is at the household level.
6We chose only censoring at the top for the variable capital gains, because the absolute amount of the
smallest values is quite limited and these observations do not overly inﬂuence the regression results. The
smallest values of capital gains represent with close to -100% a total loss. We obtain identical results when
deleting the smallest and largest 1% of observations of this variable.
10included. The unit of observation is a company, not a household.7
For the second subsample of the SCF, all households with ownership in a private business
in which they do not have an active management role are selected. The survey provides
information on up to six companies with diﬀerent legal forms. Should a household have
more than one company of the same legal form, then information is only available for the
sum of those. Overall, full information on 1486 households with ownership in 2090 (partly
combined) companies is available. The same selection rules as for the ﬁrst subsample apply,
with the sole diﬀerence that the minimum size of USD 1,000 applies to the household’s equity
share and not to the total equity of the company. As before, equity value is given as market
value. Finally, information on 1424 households and 1924 companies is used. 76% of these
households have ownership in only one company, 16% in two companies, and 8% in between
three and six companies.8
The second data source is the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), which is also
conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This survey provides
information on private companies with up to 500 employees from the non-agricultural, non-
ﬁnancial sectors. From the SSBF, only the 1998 wave is used, because this is the only
wave with information on the net worth of owners. Full information for 3496 companies is
available. In contrast to the SCF, the owner information refers always to the largest owner
and the value of equity is given as book value. In the majority of companies, the largest
owner is active in the management. For the 10.7% of companies with a hired manager, it
is possible but not necessarily the case that the largest owner is active in the management.
7See Kennickell et al. (2000) for more information on the 1998 SCF survey.
8We select the head of household as the main owner for companies in which the household has no active
management role. Since the owners do not work for the company, it is not possible to determine the main
owner according to job characteristics.
11The SSBF data diﬀerentiates between three categories of total net worth of the owner:
the book value of the ownership share, the equity value of the primary residence and the
remaining net worth. The same inclusion criteria as for the SCF apply. In the SSBF, a high
share of companies (21%) has negative equity values. Since SNWI is not well deﬁned if the
equity value is negative, only observations with positive equity values can be included in the
empirical analysis.9 Due to more extreme values, trimming of the earnings rate is done to
the 5% level. 2345 companies are included in the analysis.10
4.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The SCF data
includes ﬁve imputations for missing values. We average the variables across imputations
and then analyze them. Alternatively, it would also be possible to average results across im-
putations and to adjust standard errors. We prefer the ﬁrst method since it is more tractable
for the econometric models used in this paper. We use survey weights for the calculation
of the descriptive statistics to make them representative for the underlying population. On
average, companies have 32 employees in the SCF and 9.5 employees in the SSBF. Owners
working for the company are included in the number of employees. The size of the company
is measured with the logarithm of the number of employees. The average age of the company
in both surveys is around 14 years.
One component of returns to equity is the earnings rate. It is deﬁned as proﬁts divided
921% of the companies have negative or zero equity values. This is a common ﬁnding for small and
medium-sized enterprises. For example, KfW Research (2006) ﬁnds that almost 20% of German SMEs have
negative book values for equity.
10More detailed information on the 1998 SSBF survey is available in Bitler et al. (2001).
12by equity value. The proﬁt ﬁgures in the two subsamples of owners with active management
interest are reported before the payment of corporate tax. To make the numbers better
comparable across legal forms, we calculate the corporate tax, which has to be paid only
by C-corporations, and subtract it from the reported proﬁts. Corporate tax rates diﬀer
according to the size of proﬁts and have changed over the years. Table A in the appendix
displays the tax rates.11 As robustness check, we also show regression results without this tax
adjustment. For the subsample of owners without management interest, we only know the
amount of proﬁts that the owners received after the payment of the corporate tax. Because
the ownership share of the owners is unknown, it is not possible to calculate the total proﬁts
of the company and therefore it is not possible to calculate the respective tax liability. All
calculations for the subsample of owners without management interest are therefore based
on proﬁts after the payment of corporate tax.
The second component of returns to equity is capital gains. It is only available for owners
with a management role in the SCF. It is calculated according to the following formula:
Capital gains =
 
market value of equity
value of original investment
!1/(years since founded or acquired)
(3)
The value of the original investment is the nominal value of the equity investment. Ad-
ditional investments over time are included. This value would be the cost basis for tax
purposes, if the owner sold his or her share.
We use the two returns measures separately in the empirical analysis. It is not possible to
11C- and S-corporations are both characterized by limited liability. C-corporations have to pay corporation
tax on proﬁts that are paid out to their shareholders. In contrast, proﬁts of S-corporations are only taxed
via the income tax paid by their owners.
13add them to obtain the total returns to equity, since this would lead to double counting of
the retained earnings. The retained earnings cannot be subtracted from the earnings rate,
since it is not known which portion of proﬁts companies retain. The descriptive statistics
for earnings rate and capital gains are discussed in detail in the next section.
The measures SNWI A and SNWI B document a considerable lack of diversiﬁcation.
For owners with active management interests, SNWI A is on average 27.4% (SCF) and
23.5% (SSBF). When guarantees, collateral and loans are taken into account as well, the
average value of SNWI increases by 4.2 and 4.2 percentage points respectively.12 Owners
without management interests have a lower average value of SNWI A of 14.8%. The average
ownership share is 77.6% (SCF) and 85.3% (SSBF).
We control for ownership share in the analysis of the subsamples of owners with an active
management interest. For owners with an active management interest in the SCF it is also
known how many hours the owner works on average per week in the company. We use the
logarithm of this value in the regression as a control for eﬀort. We take the weekly hours of
the main owner. The main owner has to be self-employed in the main or in the second job
and has to report that he or she is working for the company.
The regressions contain control variables for company size, company age, legal form,
and industry, and the owner’s level of education, experience and ethnicity. The descriptive
statistics for the control variables are also shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Experience in the
SCF includes all occupations, counting years in full-time employment as such and weighting
years in part-time employment with a factor of 0.5. Experience in the SSBF is deﬁned as
the number of years owning or managing a company. All subsamples contain sole propri-
etorships, partnerships and corporations. In the subsample of owners that are not active in
12The SSBF does not include information on loans that owners receive from their companies.
14the management, the share of sole proprietorships is lower and the share of partnerships is
higher than in the subsample of owners that are active in the management. SCF regressions
for owners with active management interest contain dummies diﬀerentiating between seven
industries; the SSBF regressions contain industry controls at the two-digit SIC level.
5 Characteristics of Returns to Equity
Descriptive statistics of the return measures in this section permit a better understanding of
the data. It is important to point out that the return measures provided are not informative
about the mean or standard deviation of actual returns earned in the population of owners
of private companies for several reasons. The samples consist only of surviving ﬁrms. This
biases returns (earnings rates and capital gains) up via failed ﬁrms having dropped out, but
biases the returns down via very successful ﬁrms having gone public or having been acquired
by public ﬁrms. These issues can be overcome by looking at the return to private equity
as a whole and making various adjustments as in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).
These adjustments cannot be made at the ﬁrm level. This is an inherent problem of doing
ﬁrm level analysis, which is unﬁxable absent longitudinal ﬁrm data. Furthermore, the proﬁts
and thus the returns are overstated since they partly reﬂect the labour input of the owners,
not only the return to the invested capital.
In Table 4, we compare the returns to equity values of the two data sets. All earnings
rates are after the payment of corporate tax. Columns (1) and (2) show the returns for the
SCF subsample of owners active in management. The mean returns are relatively high with
an earnings rate of 49.8% and capital gains of 27.5%. The median values are substantially
lower: 15.2% for the earnings rate and 10.7% for capital gains. The median of total returns
15to equity with an assumed retention rate of 30% is then 21.3%.13
The mean and median values of the SSBF earnings rate (column (3)) are substantially
higher than the SCF values (126.8% and 47.8%, respectively). To investigate whether the
explanation for the diﬀerences lies with the use of the book value of equity in the SSBF data,
we calculate the earnings rate for the SCF with book values for the year 1989, the only year
in which book values are available. When we compare column (1) and (4) for the year 1989
and columns (1) and (3) for the year 1998, we ﬁnd that mean and median earnings rates
with book values are about twice as high as the earnings rates with market value. Overall,
the diﬀerences in the two data sources can therefore be explained quite well by the use of
book and market values, respectively.
We then plot the distribution of returns in Figure 1 to get a better understanding of the
data. All return measures have a unimodal distribution with high skewness, which explains
that the means are substantially higher than the medians. The SSBF earnings rate has a
higher density for relatively large returns, but otherwise the shape is similar for all return
measures.
Column (5) shows lower returns for owners without an active management role compared
to owners with an active management role. A further investigation of the data shows vari-
ation in the returns over time, with low mean returns in the survey year 1992. Compared
to other legal forms, corporations have lower earnings rates but higher capital gains. There
13We have to rely on an approximation of the retention rate, since the surveys do not provide information
on retained proﬁts. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002, p. 770) derived an approximate retention rate
of 30% from aggregate statistics. National accounts show a retention rate of around 40% for public and
private C corporations. For the entity of all private companies, the authors choose the lower value of 30%,
since private companies may have fewer growth opportunities.
16are industry diﬀerences as well: Agriculture has low earnings rates and low capital gains,
whereas manufacturing has low earnings rates but high capital gains.14 Larger and older
companies show relatively smaller earnings rates.
6 Exposure to Idiosyncratic Risk and Equity Returns
6.1 DEALING WITH ENDOGENEITY
In order to establish causality from exposure to idiosyncratic risk to equity returns, we need
to deal with the problem of endogeneity. Using the instrumental variables approach, we run
a ﬁrst-stage regression to predict instrumented values of the endogenous regressors: SNWI,
ownership share and hours worked. In the second-stage, we use the predicted values of the
endogenous variables as regressors to obtain consistent parameter estimates.
Our main endogeneity concern is reverse causality. SNWI is aﬀected by reverse causality,
since owners who know that a company is of high quality may be willing to invest more. In
this case there is a positive eﬀect of the equity return on the share of the net worth invested.
The same eﬀect is possible for ownership share. Owners may be willing to buy a larger share
of a good company. As a robustness check, we also instrument the hours worked. Owners
with management interest may adjust their eﬀort depending on the current performance of
the company.
We use owner’s age as ﬁrst instrument. The owner’s age should be related to SNWI, as
Heaton and Lucas (2000) document that the portfolio composition of individuals is inﬂuenced
by their age. Individuals above the age of 65 have a smaller share of their wealth invested
14Some industries in column (4) have fewer than 100 observations. The values should therefore be inter-
preted with caution.
17in private equity. Furthermore, net worth may increase with age, since individuals have
had more time to save. We argue that the owner’s age by itself is unrelated to equity
returns. When using it as an instrument, it is, however, important to include controls for
hours worked, experience and education, since they are related to age and it is possible
that hours worked, experience and education have a direct inﬂuence on returns.15 When
the owner’s age is used as an instrument, it is also important to include the company’s age
as control. Otherwise the results may be inﬂuenced by survivorship bias. Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) show that only 30 percent of all entrepreneurial ﬁrms have survived
after 10 years.16 As robustness check we also present results for the subsample of owners up
to the age of 65 years. We want to make sure that the eﬀect of the instrument ‘owner age’
is not completely determined by retirement on the job.
As second instrument set, we use a dummy for inheritances received in the past as well
as the logarithm of the amount of inheritances received.17 The SCF provides detailed infor-
mation on up to three inheritances that the households have received in the past. The value
of the inheritances is inﬂated with the consumer price index to the year of the survey.18 The
variable ‘dummy inheritance’ is equal to one, if at least one inheritance has been received in
the past. The variable ‘value inheritance’ is the sum of the inﬂated value of the inheritances.
15Bitler et al. (2005) use similar instruments for ownership share, namely age, age squared and dummies
for type of company acquisition.
16Survivorship bias works against ﬁnding a positive relationship between SNWI and returns to equity.
Over time the good companies remain. They will have high proﬁtability and low values of SNWI, since the
owner has had time to accumulate outside wealth.
17We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting inheritances as an instrument.
18The consumer price index is taken from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. We
selected the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers, since only this time series is available for the re-
quired length of time. The data can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.
18The logarithm of this variable is used in the ﬁrst-stage regressions. We include a dummy in
addition to the value because the dummy allows for a base eﬀect. The categories trusts as
well as transfers/gifts are not included.19
Since inheritances are an event that increases the net worth of the household, we expect
it to have a negative correlation with SNWI. The occurrence of inheritances is outside of the
control of the owner. In many cases, the inheritances will have no direct inﬂuence on the
company’s performance. However, it is important to think carefully about possible inﬂu-
ences and to discuss whether and how they can be controlled for. Work by Perez-Gonzalez
(2006) has shown that selecting a family CEO as opposed to an unrelated CEO leads to un-
derperformance of the companies. Regression to the mean is responsible for family-related
candidates typically not having the best ability for the job as CEO. The same can be argued
for owner-managers of private companies that inherited the company. Inherited companies
can have owner-managers with on average lower ability and therefore lower returns. As a
robustness check, we omit companies that have been inherited. Furthermore, an increase in
wealth through an inheritance can reduce the incentives to work hard, since the household
has access to an alternative source of income. We control for this indirect inﬂuence to the
degree that our control for hours worked is able to control for eﬀort. In addition, individuals
may care less about inherited wealth in comparison to wealth earned through hard work. As
a robustness check, we omit companies that have been inherited.
19Inheritances are arguably a bit more exogenous than trusts or transfers/gifts, since they always depend
on the exogenous event of death. If we include the two categories trusts as well as transfers/gifts in the
deﬁnition of the inheritance related instruments, we ﬁnd identical or stronger results for the inﬂuence of
SNWI on company performance, but for several speciﬁcations with capital gains as the dependent variable,
the test of overidentifying restrictions is not passed.
19For some subsamples, we also use as third instrument a dummy for home ownership. This
dummy has a value of one, if the owner of the company owns his or her primary residence.
There should be a negative correlation between this instrument and SNWI. If resources are
bound for owning the primary residence, a smaller share of net worth will be available for
investment in the company. The decision of whether to buy or to rent a house depends on
many factors, e.g. whether cheaper buying or renting opportunities are found and whether
the owner wants to stay in the area. We therefore expect the dummy variable to be unrelated
to the error term of the second-stage regression. Yet, there is a possible endogeneity issue of
more proﬁtable ﬁrms enabling owners to buy larger houses. Liu and Yermack (2007) ﬁnd for
listed companies that company performance declines after the CEOs buy very costly houses.
The authors interpret buying costly houses as a sign of managerial entrenchment. These
issues are less of a concern when using the dummy for home ownership as an instrument
rather than the value of the home.
After presenting the instruments, we discuss omitted variable bias as a further endogeneity
concern. The instruments are only valid if they pick up only the part of the variation of
the SNWI that is not caused by the omitted variables. The ﬁrst inﬂuence to be addressed
is tax evasion. Tax evaders may report lower values of SNWI to the extent that they saved
the gains from tax evasion. The relationship between owner age and tax evasion is unclear.
It is possible, however, that owners with inheritances and with own houses may be more
prone to evade taxes insofar as they are richer and the gains from tax evasion may be higher.
Tax evaders may report lower earnings rates and also lower values of SNWI to the extent
that they saved the gains from tax evasion. Therefore, a positive relationship between the
earnings rate and SNWI can be induced. However, since SNWI is a stock variable shaped by
many other factors, the inﬂuence of tax evasion is likely to be too small to aﬀect the results.
20Companies with venture capital investment may have lower values of SNWI and owner-
ship share since they have additional owners. VC ﬁnanced companies have probably younger
owners, which tend to have higher values of SNWI. The eﬀects of VC ﬁnancing and the in-
strument owner age point into opposite directions. Since the other instruments, inheritance
and home ownership, are probably not related to VC ﬁnancing, we expect that instrument-
ing is suﬃcient. Apart from that, the inﬂuence of VC ﬁnancing should be quantitatively
negligible, because less than 1% of all private equity (deﬁned as equity in sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships and corporations) in the USA is held by venture capitalists (Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002).
The ﬁnal endogeneity concern is measurement error. The market value of equity in the
SCF data may be a noisy estimate, since private companies have no quoted market value.
The book value of equity in the SSBF is calculated as the diﬀerence of the company’s assets
and liabilities. It is possible that there are errors in the measurement of assets and liabilities,
because many respondents are not required by law to draw up a balance sheet. Since
systematic relationships between the measurement error in those company characteristics
and our instruments are unlikely, we do not expect a bias due to the measurement error.
Descriptive statistics for all instrumental variables are displayed in Tables 1, 2 and 3. In
Table 5, we present the results of the ﬁrst-stage regressions for SNWI A, ownership share and
hours worked. Results for SNWI B are omitted, since they are very similar. The regressions
include all control variables from the second stage. For brevity, not all coeﬃcients are
shown.20
We start by discussing the results for the ﬁrst stage of SNWI. As expected, owner age has
20As Ang et al. (2000) and Bitler et al. (2005) we use unweighted regressions. For the SSBF the variables
used for stratiﬁcation and oversampling are publicly known. They are included as controls in the regressions.
21a negative and signiﬁcant relationship with SNWI in all subsamples. As there is no clear
theoretical guidance on the functional form for owner age, we chose the functional form that
ﬁtted the data of the subsamples best. We chose the quadratic form for the subsample of
owners not active in management, and the linear form for the other subsamples.
Both dummy inheritance and the logarithmic value of the inheritances are negatively
related to SNWI. These variables are only available for the SCF. Both instruments are
signiﬁcant for the subsample of active managers. For the subsample of owners not active in
management, only the logarithmic value of the inheritances is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
The dummy for home ownership is used for owners active in management of the SCF
only in the speciﬁcation with hours worked also instrumented. If hours worked are not
instrumented, the informational content of this instrument is not necessary. We use the
dummy for home ownership also in the subsample of owners not active in management,
because the instruments related to the inheritances are rather weak in this subsample. We
also use this instrument for the subsample of the SSBF, since inheritance information is not
available. This instrument has a negative relationship with SNWI, as anticipated, and is
always signiﬁcant.
We next turn to the speciﬁcations with ownership share as dependent variable. Owner
age has either a positive or an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. The instruments relating to inher-
itances are not signiﬁcant. As can be seen from Shea’s partial R squared (Shea, 1997),
the instruments have a better explanatory power for SNWI than for ownership share. We
searched for but could not ﬁnd convincing additional instruments with a higher explanatory
power for ownership share. In this situation, it is reassuring that the main results hold when
restricting to companies with only one owner. For these companies, inclusion of ownership
share is not relevant.
22In the ﬁrst-stage regression for hours worked, owner age shows a negative relationship
with the dependent variable. This relationship cannot purely be determined by retirement
because the coeﬃcient and its precision is nearly unchanged, if owners up to the age of 65
years are considered (results not shown). Inheritances are also negatively correlated with
hours worked. As discussed above, this highlights the importance of controlling for hours
worked, since the ﬁnancial resources of an owner may inﬂuence his or her eﬀort.
Concerning the other control variables, the inﬂuence of return risk is of most interest.
Through all subsamples, we consistently ﬁnd a negative inﬂuence of return risk on SNWI
and on ownership share. Risk has a larger inﬂuence on SNWI than on ownership share.
For columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase of risk
decreases SNWI by 4.7 percentage points whereas ownership share is only decreased by 1.1
percentage points.
We calculated all ﬁrst-stage regressions with the restriction of a maximum owner age
of 65 years. There are only marginal changes with respect to signiﬁcance levels and only
one insigniﬁcant instrument changes its sign. It is important to note that the negative
relationship between owner age and SNWI remains even if the age restriction is applied.21
21Since it is possible that some owners reduce their activity as managers or as monitors of the management
before reaching the full retirement age of 65 years, we also checked the robustness of the results for an age
restriction of 60 years. Qualitatively we obtained the same results but some coeﬃcients are estimated with
less precision due to the reduced number of observations.
236.2 INFLUENCE ON THE EARNINGS RATE
6.2.1 Owners Active in Management
Table 6 shows results of the investigation of how exposure to idiosyncratic risk inﬂuences the
earnings rate. In column (1), we show a standard OLS regression that suﬀers from reverse
causality and non-standard measurement error. The non-standard measurement error causes
a negative bias as equity is included in the denominator of the dependent variable and in
the numerator of the independent variable SNWI A. It is therefore not possible to interpret
the negative sign of SNWI A in an economic sense. The coeﬃcient of ownership share is
not inﬂuenced by the measurement error. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant incentive eﬀect.
Owners with a higher ownership share may work harder, because they obtain a higher share
of the resulting proﬁts.
In column (2), we show the ﬁrst instrumental variable (IV) estimate. The coeﬃcient on
SNWI A is now positive and signiﬁcant. A 10 percentage point increase in SNWI A increases
the earnings rate by 11.8 percentage points. Compared to the unweighted mean earnings
rate of 44.1%, it is clear that this eﬀect is economically important. This result is in line with
our hypothesis that owners demand compensation for exposure to idiosyncratic risk. After
instrumenting ownership, we no longer ﬁnd a positive incentive eﬀect. Since there are more
instruments than endogenous regressors, it is possible to test the overidentifying restrictions.
This test is passed with a p-value of 0.44. Company size and company age have no inﬂuence
on the earnings rate.22
The regression also contains a control for return risk. Companies with higher return risk
22We checked whether there is a non-linear relationship between SNWI and returns to equity by including
squared terms of SNWI. However, the squared terms were never signiﬁcant.
24earn higher returns on average. The size of the eﬀect is in a sensible range. An increase of
return risk by one standard deviation increases returns by 16.5 percentage points. There is
therefore additional evidence that idiosyncratic risk is compensated in the cross-section of
ﬁrms. Not only is the share of net worth that the owner invested important, the overall level
of return risk matters as well.
In our investigation, the results for owners with an active management role are possibly
inﬂuenced by eﬀort. An owner-manager with a higher share of net worth invested in a
company is ﬁnancially more dependent on its success and may therefore work harder. The
instrumental variables approach does not control for this possibility. We therefore control
for the average weekly hours the owner-manager works in the company. This control has a
negative but insigniﬁcant inﬂuence on the returns.23 If hours worked is instrumented as well,
the results are a bit weaker. This is likely because owner age is the strongest instrument
for both SNWI and hours implying that some of the power to identifying the impact of
SNWI is lost once hours are instrumented for as well. Due to the diﬃculty of ﬁnding extra
instruments to instrument powerfully for hours too, we decided not to instrument for hours
in all speciﬁcations.
The regressions contain further controls for the owner’s level of education, work experience
and ethnicity as well as controls for legal form, industry and year. The coeﬃcients are not
shown for brevity.
To test the robustness of the results, we calculate several variations shown in columns
(3) to (9). All variations conﬁrm the signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence of SNWI found for the
23At ﬁrst glance, the negative sign of hours worked in a returns regression can be surprising. It can be
explained by the fact that the owner-managers of poorly performing companies were working very hard to
avoid failure.
25base case. We calculate the earnings rate before the payment of corporate tax. We want to
make sure that the results are robust to the non-linear adjustment for corporate tax that
we introduced to make the returns more comparable. We restrict the sample to owners with
a maximum age of 65 years in order to exclude the possibility that our results are driven
by retirement on the job. We use the broader measure for exposure to idiosyncratic risk,
SNWI B. We restrict the analysis to the largest company of each household, which means
that we cover the most important investment and there is no need to be concerned about
within-household correlation across companies. We also restrict the analysis to companies
in which the household has an ownership share of 100%, thereby excluding the possibility
that the earnings rate could be inﬂuenced by the exposure to idiosyncratic risk of another
owner. As further robustness check we treat hours worked as an endogenous variable. The
variable hours worked remains insigniﬁcant. It has now a positive coeﬃcient, whereas before
its coeﬃcient was mostly negative. As a ﬁnal robustness check, we exclude companies that
are inherited. This is to make sure that the results from using inheritances as an instrument
are not driven by owners who inherited their ﬁrm having lower SNWI and inherited ﬁrms
having lower earnings rates. The test of overidentiﬁcation is passed for all speciﬁcations.
Results from the SSBF are shown in Table 7. The results of the SCF and the SSBF are
quite similar. In the IV estimation of column (2), we ﬁnd a positive inﬂuence of SNWI on the
earnings rate. An increase of SNWI A by 10 percentage points is related to an increase of the
earnings rate of 28.8 percentage points. Results are robust to the calculation of the earnings
rate before the payment of corporate tax; to a restriction to a maximum age of owners of
65 years; to the use of the alternative measure of exposure to idiosyncratic risk, SNWI B;
and to a restriction to companies with only one owner.24 We also conﬁrmed that results are
24For each company, the SSBF gives the sum for all owners for loans guaranteed by the owners, the value
26robust to the exclusion to inherited ﬁrms. The results are not shown because instruments
related to inheritances are not available for this data set. As in the case of the SCF, we see
a positive inﬂuence of return risk on returns to equity, although it is not signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. The test of overidentifying restrictions is passed for the speciﬁcation with one
owner. For the other speciﬁcations, it is not possible to conduct this test, since they contain
as many instruments as endogenous variables.
6.2.2 Owners Not Active in Management
Investment objectives diﬀer between owners with and without management interests. For
owners with management interests, the equity investment is connected to the employment
decision. Not only are the returns on investment important; alternative employment op-
portunities must also be taken into account. Some owners with management interests also
obtain substantial non-pecuniary beneﬁts from being their own boss. We do control for
hours worked in the SCF data, but this variable could be an imperfect measure of eﬀort.
The results for owners without active management interests are a more direct test of our hy-
pothesis in the sense that they only refer to investment decisions. They cannot be inﬂuenced
by eﬀort or employment considerations.
The results for owners without a management role are presented in Table 8. The regres-
sions do not contain a control for ownership share, since this information is not available.
As in the previous tables, the OLS regression in column (1) shows a negative coeﬃcient for
SNWI A due to non-standard measurement error. The instrumented regression in column (2)
of owner assets that are used as collateral and the volume of loans between the owner and the company. For
the calculation of SNWI B, this information is multiplied by the ownership share of the largest owner and
added to the equity investment to get an approximation of this owner’s personal involvement.
27conﬁrms our hypothesis for owners without an active management role as well. An increase
of 10 percentage points in SNWI A translates into an increase of 12.2 percentage points in
the earnings rate.
As a robustness check, we restrict the analysis to owners with a maximum age of 65
years. The results in column (3) show that the inﬂuence of idiosyncratic risk remains. A
restriction to the owner’s largest company (column (4)) also conﬁrms our hypothesis. The
overidentiﬁcation test is passed for all speciﬁcations. We cannot calculate SNWI B for this
subsample and we cannot restrict to companies with just one owner, since ownership shares
are not known. We also cannot exclude inherited companies as a robustness check, since the
type of acquisition is not known.
6.3 INFLUENCE ON CAPITAL GAINS
In Table 9, we present results relating to the second component of returns to equity, capital
gains. The number of observations in the capital gains regressions is smaller, since companies
with an initial investment of zero cannot be included. As in the earnings rate regression,
the OLS estimate in column (1) is inﬂuenced by non-standard measurement error. Equity
is included both in the numerator of the dependent variable and in the numerator of the
independent variable SNWI, which causes a positive bias.
The standard IV speciﬁcation in column (2) shows a positive inﬂuence of exposure to
idiosyncratic risk on capital gains. An increase of SNWI A by 10 percentage points is
associated with an increase in capital gains of 13.5 percentage points. As robustness checks,
we restrict to owners with a maximum age of 65 years, use the alternative regressor SNWI B,
restrict the analysis to the largest company of the owner and consider only companies with
28one owner. All speciﬁcations conﬁrm the positive inﬂuence of exposure to idiosyncratic
risk on capital gains. As a further robustness check, we also instrument the variable hours
worked. As in the earnings rate speciﬁcation of Table 6, the instrumented variable hours
worked has a positive but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. We also calculate a regression excluding
inherited ﬁrms. With these speciﬁcations, we can again conﬁrm the positive inﬂuence of
idiosyncratic risk on capital gains. The test of overidentifying restrictions is passed for all
speciﬁcations.
As was the case for the previous subsamples, we ﬁnd that return risk has a positive
inﬂuence on capital gains. In the speciﬁcation of column (2), the coeﬃcient of return risk is
only signiﬁcant at the 12% level though. A one standard deviation increase in return risk
leads to an increase in capital gains of 6.2 percentage points. Compared to the inﬂuence on
the earnings rate of the same companies, the inﬂuence is smaller.
6.4 IMPLICATIONS
The empirical ﬁndings of this paper have important implications for our understanding of
investment decisions at private companies. We show that owners exposed to idiosyncratic
risk require higher returns as compensation for their risk exposure. The realisation of a
business idea can therefore depend on the net worth of the potential entrepreneur. If the
investment volume is large relative to the net worth, then the business idea needs to have
a higher expected return in order to be realized. Furthermore, the available volume of
additional bank or equity ﬁnance can be crucial, since it allows the potential entrepreneur
to employ fewer of his or her own resources.
It was found that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and of staying in business
29increases after an inheritance (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a and Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994b),
which is interpreted as evidence of liquidity constraints. Our results suggest an additional
interpretation. Because exposure to idiosyncratic risk decreases through the inheritance, the
required rate of return on investment projects decreases and therefore more business ideas
will become worthwhile. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also argue that the eﬀect of inheritances
is unlikely to be only evidence for liquidity constraints. The authors use past and future
inheritances as an instrument for wealth and ﬁnd that both instruments help to predict
business entry. It is therefore likely that inheritances capture not only liquidity eﬀects.
Does the ﬁnding of this study, that owners receive compensation for their exposure to
idiosyncratic risk, open up a possibility for some owners to earn excess returns? Ownership
shares are often equal in private companies due to control considerations (Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon, 2000). If a rich owner invests a share in a company that otherwise has poorer
owners, he or she could expect a return that is more than suﬃcient to compensate for his or
her own risk exposure. However, this consideration leaves the open question of low average
returns of private equity untouched.
7 Conclusions
Owners of private companies typically have a high share of their personal net worth invested
in a single private company, which exposes them to the idiosyncratic risk of the company.
This paper seeks to determine whether the owners require compensation for their risk ex-
posure. Using information from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Survey of
Small Business Finances (SSBF), we ﬁnd that the degree of risk exposure has a statistically
and economically signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on returns on equity. We calculate separate
30results for the earnings rate and for capital gains, as well as for owners with and without an
active management role. We therefore show that owners are aware of the risk and demand
compensation. This result improves our understanding of the behaviour of owners of private
companies.
In future research, it would be interesting to test whether owners of public companies
also receive higher returns, if they are exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Founders or families
hold concentrated ownership stakes in several public companies. If these owners demand
compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk, then it could be reﬂected in a higher
earnings rate or better stock market performance.
31Table 1: Descriptive Statistics SCF - Owners Active in Management
This table provides descriptive statistics of the sample. Descriptive statistics are calculated using survey
weights. Statistics are representative of the underlying population.
Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Number of employees 31.95 4 216.2 1 5000
Company age (in years) 13.82 11 10.73 1 67
Earnings rate
after corporate tax (in %) 49.81 15.25 110.2 -22.5 1062
Earnings rate
before corporate tax (in %) 51.82 16.29 117.1 -22.5 1560
Capital gains (in %) 27.47 10.70 58.58 -99.88 747.0
SNWI A (in %) 27.42 20 24.81 0.002 99.71
SNWI B (in %) 31.58 23.14 28.15 -11.72 100
Ownership share (in %) 77.58 100 31.20 0.001 100
Return risk 11.26 7.14 22.45 2.93 261.3
Hours worked 46.74 50 19.02 1 133
Experience (in years) 28.01 27 11.74 0 85
Owner age (in years) 49.51 49 10.84 21 94
Dummy inheritance 0.301 0 0.459 0 1
Value inheritance (in million USD) 0.049 0 0.787 0 194.1
Dummy home ownership 0.923 1 0.26 0 1
Industry Legal form Education Ethnicity
Agriculture 11.6% Sole prop. 40.6% No high school 5.7% White 92.8%
Construction, mining 8.5% Partnership 22.2% High school 23.8% Hispanic 1.8%
Manufacturing 8.0% S-corp. 19.4% BA 34.2% Black 2.1%
Retail, wholesale 17.8% C-corp. 17.8% MA 13.4% Asian 3.3%
Services 54.1% PhD 22.9%
32Table 2: Descriptive Statistics SCF - Owners Not Active in Management
This table provides descriptive statistics of the sample. Descriptive statistics are calculated using survey
weights. Statistics are representative of the underlying population.
Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Earnings rate
after corporate tax (in %) 19.72 1.73 62.27 -20 516
SNWI A (in %) 14.84 5.35 21.50 0.002 100
Return risk 31.60 17.03 44.60 7.56 217.0
Experience (in years) 32.07 32 12.24 0 87
Owner age (in years) 55.19 54.00 12.46 23 94
Dummy inheritance 0.399 0 0.490 0 1
Value inheritance (in million USD) 0.079 0 1.12 0 194.1
Dummy home ownership 0.95 1 0.21 0 1
Legal form Education Ethnicity
Sole prop. 7.3% No high school 1.7% White 94.3%
Partnership 14.6% High school 8.8% Hispanic 0.7%
Limited Partnership 47.2% BA 40.9% Black 1.4%
S-corp. 13.1% MA 20.1% Asian 3.6%
C-corp. 12.8% PhD 28.5%
Other 5.0%
33Table 3: Descriptive Statistics SSBF
This table provides descriptive statistics of the sample. Descriptive statistics are calculated using survey
weights. Statistics are representative of the underlying population.
Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Number of employees 9.51 3 26.09 1 482
Company age (in years) 14.35 12 11.60 1 104
Earnings rate
after corporate tax (in %) 126.8 47.79 193.5 -61.95 1002
Earnings rate
before corporate tax (in %) 133.5 50.00 207.6 -61.95 1507
SNWI A (in %) 23.50 16.12 22.15 0.004 98.92
SNWI B (in %) 27.71 19.50 26.00 0.041 100
Ownership share (in %) 85.27 100 24.35 1 100
Return risk 12.15 9.13 11.29 3.41 92.73
Experience (in years) 19.13 18 11.62 0 72
Owner age (in years) 50.79 50 11.21 21 95
Dummy home ownership 0.892 1 0.310 0 1
Industry Legal form Education Ethnicity
Construction, mining 11.6% Sole prop. 50.2% No high school 3.5% White 86.3%
Manufacturing 8.5% Partnership 5.8% High school 47.8% Hispanic 5.3%
Retail trade 28.2% S-corp. 23.8% College 48.7% Black 3.9%



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 7: Inﬂuence on Earnings Rate - Owners Active in Management (SSBF)
This table reports regressions of the earnings rate on company characteristics. Earnings rates are after
corporate tax if not declared otherwise. Regressions contain additional controls for industry at the two-digit
SIC level, education, experience, ethnicity, legal form, region and urban versus rural area. The regressors
SNWI and ownership share are instrumented in columns (2) to (5); the regressor SNWI is instrumented in
column (6). Instruments are owner age and dummy home owner. Corresponding ﬁrst-stage regressions are
shown in Table 5, columns (7) and (8). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity. *,
**, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV IV IV IV
before owner age
all comp. all comp. corp. tax ≤ 65 years all comp. one owner
SNWI A -1.77*** 2.88** 3.29** 2.82** 3.51***
(0.163) (1.19) (1.43) (1.32) (1.15)
SNWI B 3.01**
(1.33)
Ownership share 0.675*** -1.11 -4.31 -1.22 -3.97
(0.186) (10.25) (12.21) (12.86) (11.84)
Return risk -0.401 0.732 0.140 0.812 0.246 1.40**
(0.363) (1.97) (2.36) (2.61) (2.24) (0.686)
Company size 9.56*** -23.39 -39.47 -25.23 -42.15 -18.14**
(3.51) (49.55) (59.21) (63.62) (59.33) (8.10)
Company age -0.185 -0.187 -0.683 -0.057 -0.155 0.700
(0.367) (1.26) (1.51) (1.42) (1.34) (0.760)
Number of obs. 2345 2345 2345 2084 2345 1394
Number of owners 2345 2345 2345 2084 2345 1394
Overident. test, χ2 0.722
(dof, p-value) (1, 0.396)
38Table 8: Inﬂuence on Earnings Rate - Owners Not Active in Management (SCF)
This table reports regressions of the earnings rate on company characteristics. Earnings rates are after
corporate tax. Regressions contain additional controls for year, education, experience, ethnicity and legal
form. The regressor SNWI is instrumented in columns (2) to (4). Instruments are owner age, square of
owner age, dummy inheritance, log value of inheritance and dummy home owner. Corresponding ﬁrst-stage
regressions are shown in Table 5, column (6). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity
and within-household correlation across ﬁrms. *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
owner age
all comp. all comp. ≤ 65 years largest comp.
SNWI A -0.121 1.22** 1.81* 1.03*
(0.077) (0.602) (1.03) (0.621)
Return risk 0.028 0.149** 0.170* 0.039*
(0.027) (0.059) (0.096) (0.023)
Number of observations 1924 1924 1463 1347
Number of households 1424 1424 1081 1347
Overidentiﬁcation test, χ2 3.38 5.92 0.412
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CG, with man. interest, SCF
Note: ER stands for earnings rate; CG stands for capital gains.
41Appendix
Table A: Tax Brackets
This table reports historical tax rates that are taken from www.taxpolicycenter.org. From 1994 onwards,
the rates can also be found at the home page of the American Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov.
Proﬁt range (in USD) Tax rate Survey years
≤ 0 0% 1989 – 2001
> 0 – ≤ 50,000 15% 1989 – 2001
> 50,000 – ≤ 75,000 25% 1989 – 2001
> 75,000 – ≤ 100,000 34% 1989 – 2001
> 100,000 – ≤ 335,000 39% 1989 – 2001
> 335,000 34% 1989 – 1992
> 335,000 – ≤ 10,000,000 34% 1995 – 2001
> 10,000,000 – ≤ 15,000,000 35% 1995 – 2001
> 15,000,000 – ≤ 18,333,333 38% 1995 – 2001
> 18,333,333 35% 1995 – 2001
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